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Executive Summary
In the last two decades, the role ofpatents in the U.S. innovation system has
become increasingly troublesome, driven bytwo apparently mundane changes
in patent law and policy. Economic analysisdoes not support abolishing pat-
ents, and even weakening the fundamentalpresumption of validity for appro-
priately issued patents would carry serious policyrisks. The alternative is to
make sure that, before they can be usedto restrict the commercial activities of
competitors, patents have gotten the appropriatescrutiny to ensure their valid-
ity. At the same time, we need toaccept that the PTO will still make mistakes,
and create a judicial system that deals withthose mistakes in a balancedway.
Doing this without art infeasible increasein resources for the Patent Office will
require that the system be significantly modified.The modifications should be
carefully tuned to create incentivesso that private parties have the incentive
and opportunity to bring informationto bear, but have limited incentive and
opportunity to act simply to gum up the works.
I.Introduction
Over the course of the nineteenth andtwentieth centuries, the United
States evolved from a colonial backwaterto become the pre-eminent
economic and technological power of the world.The foundation of this
evolution was the systematic exploitationand application of technol-
ogy to economic problems: initially agriculture,transportation, com-
munication and the manufacture of goods,and then later health care,
information technology, and virtuallyevery aspect of modern life.
From the beginning of the republic, thepatent system has played a
key role in this evolution. It providedeconomic rewards as an incentive
to invention, creating a somewhat protectedeconomic environment
in which innovators can nurture anddevelop their creations intoJaffe and Lerner
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commercially viable products. Based inthe Constitution itself, and
codified in roughly its modern form in1836, the patent system was
an essential aspectof the legal framework in whichinventions from
Edison's light bulb and the Wrightbrothers' airplane to the cell phone
and Prozac were developed.
In the last two decades, however,the role of patents in the U.S. inno-
vation system has changed fromfuel for the engine to sand in the gears.
Two apparently mundane changesin patent law and policy have sub-
tly but inexorably transformedthe patent system from a shieldthat
innovators could use to protectthemselves, to a grenade that firms lob
indiscriminately at their competitors,thereby increasing the cost and
risk of innovation rather thandecreasing it.
Examples of dysfunctional patent behaviorhave become staples of
the business and popular press.They range from. the amusing and
economically irrelevant, to not-so-funny casesthat seriously threaten
important technologies in importantindustries:
Patents on inventions that are triviallyobvious, such as the "Method
for Swinging on a Swing,""invented" by a five-year-old, and "User
Operated Amusement Apparatus forKicking the User's Buttocks"
("invented" by a supposed grown-up);
Patents in areas new to patenting,but covering purported discover-
ies familiar to practitionersand academics alike, such asAmazon.com's
attempt to prevent Bamesandnoble.comfrom allowing customers to
buy books with a singlemouse-click, and a bright MBA student's pat-
ents on an option-pricingformula published in the academic finance
literature two decades earlier;
Patents that have become weaponsfor firms to harass competitors,
such as the decade-long effort byRambus, a semiconductor designer,
to control computer memorytechnology by making sure that a long
string of patents, all derivedfrom a single 1990 patent application,
incorporated important features of anindustry-wide standrd devel-
oped through a voluntary industrystandard-setting association.
Two major recent policy studies bythe Federal Trade Commission
(U.S. Federal Trade Commission, 2003)and the Board on Science, Tech-
nology and Economic Policy of theNational Research Council (Merrill,
Levin, and Myers, 2004, citedhereinafter as "STEP Report") have rec-
ommended significant changes to addressthese issues. In this paper,
we provide anoverview of the issues and discusspossible changes to
address the widely perceived shortcomingsof the current system.'Innovation and Its Discontents 29
II.They Fixed It, and Now It's Broke
The origin of these pathologiesgoes back to 1982, when the process
for judicial appeal of patentcases in the federal courts was changed,
so that such appeals are now all heard bya single, specialized
appeals court, rather than the twelve regionalcourts of appeal, as had
previously been the case. And in the early 1990s, Congresschanged the
structure of fees and financing of the U.S. Patent andTrademark Office
(PTO) itself, trying to turn it intoa kind of service agency whose costs
of operation are covered by fees paid by itsclients (the patent appli-
cants).
It is now apparent that these seeminglymundane procedural
changes, taken together, have resultedin the most profound changes
in U.S. patent policy and practice since 1836. Thenew court of appeals
has interpreted patent law to make iteasier to get patents, easier to
enforce patents against others, easier toget large financial awards from
such enforcement, and harder for those accused ofinfringing patents to
challenge the patents' validity. At roughly thesame time, the new ori-
entation of the patent office has combined with thecourt's legal inter-
pretations to make it much easier to get patents. Howevercomplex the
origins and motivations of these two Congressionalactions, it is clear
that no one sat down and decided that whatthe U.S. economy needed
was to transform patents into much more potent legalweapons, while
simultaneously making them much easier toget.
An unforeseen outcome has beenan alarming growth in legal wran-
gling over patents. More worrisome still, therisk of being sued, and
demands by patent holders for royaltypayments to avoid being sued,
are seen increasingly as major costs of bringingnew products and pro-
cesses to market. Thus the patent systemintended to foster andpro-
tect innovationis generating waste and uncertaintythat hinder and
threaten the innovative process.
The growth in the shear magnitude of thepatent phenomenon can
be seen in figures 2.1 and 2.2. The weakeningof examination standards
and the increase in patent applications hasled to a dramatic increase
in the number of patents granted in the U.S.Figure 2.1 shows that the
number of patents granted in the U.S., whichincreased at less than 1
percent per year from 1930 until 1982 (theyear the CAFC was created),
roughly tripled between 1983 and 2004 (from 62thousand per year to
187 thousand per year, an annual rate of increase ofabout 5.4 percent).
Applications, too, have ballooned, to the point that thereare now about
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While some of this increaseappears to reflect real growth in inno-
vation, it is clear that a large part of theincrease is a response to the
increased laxity of the PTO, whichgrants a significantly larger frac-
tion of the applications it receives thando its counterparts in Europe
and Japan. Figure 2.2 ismore worrisome still, showing a dramatic and
inexorable increase since the early1990s in the rate of litigation around
patents. The number of patentcases filed has doubled in a decade and
continues to rise. And the cost of defendinga patent suit has risen as
well; a patent infringement allegationfrom a competitor cannow mean
legal fees in the millions. Foran under-capitalized startup, this prospect
creates an overwhelmingpressure to settle even frivolous complaints.
Consumers therefore have lessaccess to new productsfrom lifesav-
ing drugs to productivity-enhancingsoftwarethan would be thecase
if innovative companieswere not distracted from innovation by litiga-
tion and fear of litigation.
Much public attention has focusedon the expansion of patenting
into areas where itwas previously unimportant or nonexistent, such
as biotechnology, software and business methods.Indeed, some of the
worst abuses are in these areas. Butconcern about specific technologies
potentially masks the deeper, fundamentalproblem. The incentives
in the system now encourage frivolousapplications, cursory review
of those applications by the PTO,and indiscriminate filing ofpatent
infringement suits as a genericcompetitive weapon. To get thesystem
back on track, the systemmust be changed so that its incentivesdis-
courage frivolous applications, encourage rigorouspatent examination,
and discourage patent litigation wherethere is not a true inventionto
protect.
It is time to recognize that theaccidental combination of strength-
ening the legal value of patentswhile reducing the rigor ofpatent
examination has damaged the system. It'stime for a recalibration. Since
the source of the mess is the combinationof easier success in the courts
and at the PTO, our proposedrecalibration addresses both of these
venues.
III.Goals and Objectives
Before getting to recommendations,it is important to be clear about
what it is that any reform of thepatent system ought to be trying to
accomplish. While different analysts ofthe patent landscape haveJaffe and Lerner
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emphasized different aspects of the patentpolicy problems, there is
general agreement on broad goalsfor reform of the system:
Improve patent quality.2 "Patentquality" is, to some extent, in the
eye of thebeholder. Certainly, as illustrated byexamples discussed
above, people are getting patentsfor inventions that are not new and!
or are obvious.One way to solve this, of course,would be to make it
much harder to get a patent onanything. If we did that, the few pat-
ents that were issuedwould be of very high quality, inthe sense of
being very deserved by theapplicant. But the objective of patentqual-
ity has to be more than justmaking sure bad patents don't issue.It has
to include also making surethat inventors do get patentswhen they
have a truly novel, nonobviousinvention, that such patents are pro-
cessed relatively quickly andreliably, and that once grantedthey pro-
vide an adequate property right toprotect subsequent investment in
the invention.
Reduce uncertainty. The primaryobjective of reform should be to
reduce the uncertainty that nowpervades many aspects of the pat-
ent system. (Ironically, theonly aspect of the patent processthat has
become more certain is theapplication process itself, as theultimate
granting of a patent from eachoriginal application has become almost
a sure thing!) Thesand in the gears of the innovationmachine is that
companies and individuals mustconstantly fear that their researchand
product development may come tonaught, because someone is going
to assert an as-yet unknown oruntested patent against them. Further,
when such an assertion of patentinfringement is made, the uncertainty
about the ability to defend againstthat assertion often leads either to
abandonment of the allegedlyinfringing technology or to an agree-
ment to pay possibly unnecessaryroyalties.
Keep costs under control. ThePTO currently spends roughly $1bil-
lion/year for its operations. Patentapplicants spend several times that
amount, and patent litigantsbillions more. These resourcesmight be
well spent, if they achieved areasonably smoothly functioning sys-
tem. But the system is notworking well, and it is reasonable towonder
whether we need to invest moreof society's resources in the patent
process. Ideally, wemight argue, the PTO's financesshould be decou-
pled from the amount that it raisesin the form of fees: rather, itshould
spend whatever it takes to ensurehigh-quality applications. Realisti-
cally, however, it is unlikelythat dramatically increased resources are
going to be available,particularly for the operation of thePTO itself.Innovation and Its Discontents 33
So we need to look for solutions thatgo beyond throwing money at the
problem.
IV.Some Simple Truths
The next step towards reform is to understandsome basic realities
about the innovation process.
Mistakes Will Always Be with Us
Patent examination is never going to be perfect. Examinersare human.
More important, there is an essentially irreducibleaspect of judgment
in determining if an invention is trulynew. After all, even young Albert
Einstein faced challenges while assessingapplications as a "Patent
Examiner-Third Class" in the Swiss Patent Office (Clark,1973). There-
fore, we cannot hope to have a system in whichno "bad" patents ever
issue. What is important is to havea system with fewer bad patents.
And, since there will always be mistakes, it isimportant to have a sys-
tem that functions reasonably well despite the issuance ofsome bad
patents.
Better examination will requiremore resources. At current applica-
tion rates, it would be very expensive to give allpatent applications an
examination sufficiently thorough to reduce significantlythe problem
of bad patents being issued. Now, the patentsystem is important, so it
is possible that spending several billion additionaldollars on the PTO
would be worthwhile for society. But this kindof dramatic increase in
PTO resources does not seemvery realistic in the current fiscal environ-
ment. Fortunately, it is also not necessary to expend theresources nec-
essary to provide very reliable examination for all patent applications.
Much More Chaff Than Wheat
The first step to understanding why greatlyincreasing the resources
for examination is not the best solutionto the problem is to understand
that most patents are, and always will be, worthlessand unimportant.
This is not a feature of the patent office; it isa feature of the innovation
process. It is partly due to the human tendency forus each to think
that our ideas are better than other people thinkthey are. But it also
reflects a deeper attribute of theprocess of technological development:
the significance of a new idea usually cannot be knownwhen it is first34 Jaffe and Lemer
developed, because that significance depends onsubsequent develop-
ments, both technological andeconomic. Many, many, "good" ideas are
patented that never actually turn out to be worthanything. It is not that
they shouldn't have been patented tobegin with. It's just that for every
invention with lasting technological oreconomic significance, there will
always be dozens or hundreds ofideas that seemed potentially worth-
while, but which eventually proved to bevalueless.
The fact that almost all patents areultimately worthless has an
important implication for the "patentquality" problem. If most patents
are doomed to beconsigned to the dust bin of technological history,
it can't make sense to spend a lotof resources to make sure that they
all receive very high quality examinationbefore issuing. The legions
of inventors and patent attorneys may notlike to think about this,
but for the vast majority of patentapplications, it will simply never
mattereither to the inventor, her employer, orcompetitorswhether
the patent is allowed to issue or not.
Day in and day out, most of what patentexaminers do is like what
the officials do in the last minute of afootball game where one team is
already winning by 30 points. They gothrough the motions of making
rulings, because rulings have to be made,but they don't matter to the
outcome of the game. The keydifference is that in the patent game,
much of the time no one knows whetherthis particular case is going
to matter or not. It is as ifnobodythe officials, the players, and the
coacheshave any idea of the score of the game, orif the game even
matters. But they all take it seriouslybecause there is some chance that
the particular "game" they are playingwill turn out (months or years
later) to be important. For the ones that doturn out to be important,
it will matter a lot if patents aregranted that should have been. But
for the others, there will never be importanttechnological or economic
consequences. And these "others" arethe vast majority of all applica-
tions in the system.
"Rational Ignorance"
If careful examination is expensive,and the vast majority of patents
will never matter to anyone, then it wouldbe inefficient to expend soci-
ety's resources on careful examinationof all patent applications. In the
colorful phrase of Mark Lemley (2002), we canthink of the poor quality
of patent examination as representing"Rational Ignorance," by which
he means that society is rationally choosing toremain ignorant aboutInnovation and Its Discontents 35
which patents really should begranted by the PTO. Len-deyargues that
it is, in fact, reasonably efficientto simply accept that PTO examination
will be of poor quality: and that thecases that really matter will have to
be sorted out in the courts. Courtcases are expensive, but because only
the small fraction of patents thatmatter will ever get litigated, Lemley
argues that the cost of litigation is, overall, efficient.
We agree with Lemley that it wu1d beinefficient to provide thor-
ough examination for all applicationsat the current rate of patent appli-
cation. We disagree, however, that thecurrent situation is acceptably
efficient. First, while the out-of-pocketcost of litigation may be toler-
able, the intangible cost ofa system with pervasive low-quality patents
is much higher than just thecost of paying lawyers to ifie and defend
patent cases. The uncertainty that thecurrent system creates for all par-
ties regarding who can legallyuse what technologies is a cost that is
very hard to quantify, but is surely significant. Talkto anyone involved
in trying to commercializenew technologies, and you are likely to hear
complaints about the headaches anduncertainty created by overlap-
ping patent claims. Further, this uncertaintyundermines everyone's
incentives to invest in new technology: Fromthe perspective of society
as a whole, the loss of new products andprocesses that never make it
to market, or that gain a toehold andare then abandoned after a threat-
ened patent fight, is much larger thanthe visible costs of patent liti-
gation. And, fortunately, thereare changes that could be made in the
system that would improve patent quality withoutrequiring dramatic
increases in the resources used in theexamination process.
Inventors Respond to How the PatentOffice Behaves
The key to more efficient patentexamination is to go beyond think-
ing about what patent examiners do,to consider how the nature of the
examination process affects the behavior ofinventors and firms. To put
it crudely, if the patent office allows badpatents to issue, this encour-
ages people with bad applications to showup. While the increase in the
rate of patent applicationsover the last two decades is driven bymany
factors, one important factor is thesimple fact that it has gotten so much
easier to get a patent, so applications thatnever would have been sub-
mitted before now look like theyare worth a try: Conversely, if the PlO
pretty consistently rejected applications forbad patents, people would
understand that bad applicationsare a waste of time and money. While
some people would still tryeither because theyaren't smart enoughJaffe and Lerner
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to know they have a badapplication, or because they are willing totake
a roll of the dicethenumber of applications would likely beconsider-
ably lower than it has been in recent years.
Consider, just to illustrate the idea,the following thought experi-
ment. Suppose that the PTOcould dramatically reduce the issuanceof
patents on obvious or non-novelinventions by doubling the amountof
time that the examiner spent on the averageapplication. If the rate of
application were unaffected by this change,it would require an approx-
imate doubling of the PTO budget, astwice as many examiners would
be needed to handle the flow ofapplications in a reasonable period of
time. But it is unlikely that the rateof application would be unaffected
by a dramatic change in examinationstandards. It is hard to know how
much the flow of applications wouldbe affected. But if the number
of applications made each year werecut in half, then this doublingof
examiner effort per patent could bebrought about with no increase in
the overall PTO budget.
This hypothetical is not intended tosuggest that the problem is that
easy; it is only meant toillustrate how the incentives faced byinventors
and firms affect the efficiency of the system.As the quality of patent
examination has deteriorated, theincentive for submitting marginal
patent applications increased.Avicious cycle has emerged inwhich bad
examination increases the application rate,which in turn overwhelms
the examiners, reducing examinationquality further and feeding on
itself. If tools could be found to improvepatent quality, this feedback
would operate in the other direction,reducing the application rate and
freeing up resources to further improvequality.
Potential Litigants Respond to How theCourts Behave
When the CAFC issues rulingsthat increase the chance of the patentee
prevailing in an infringement suit, the consequencesof this change are
not limited to possible changesin the outcome of specific cases.Such a
change in perceived success probabilitieschanges what disputes are, in
fact, litigated. Conversations with attorneysinvolved in patent disputes
make clear that the CAFC's strengtheningof the offensive and defensive
weapons of the patentee hassignificantly increased patentees' willing-
ness to bring suit.Similarly, the change has significantlydecreased the
wfflingness of accused infringers to fight, evenwhen they believe that
the patents being used to threatenthem are not valid. Constraining the
growth in litigation, and the uncertaintycreated for all innovators by
the risk of suit, will require a change inthese incentives.Innovation and Its Discontents 37
Get Information to Flow into the PTO
Another important aspect of incentives hasto do with information: who
has it, and what do they do with it?Much of the information needed
to decide if a given patent application shouldissueparticularly infor-
mation about what related technologies alreadyexistis in the hands
of competitors of the applicant, rather thanin the hands of the PTO.
And there are strong incentives for firmsto share this information. If a
competitor of mine has filed a patent application, thelast thing I want
to see is for them to be issued a patenton an application that would
have been rejected if the P10 had knownabout my technology. I would
thus have a strong incentive to provide thisinformation, if only the
PTO would give me an opportunity for input,and if taking advantage
of such an opportunity does not createstrategic disadvantages for me
down the road. So creating opportunities ofthis sort is another way
that the system could exploit the incentivesof private parties in order
to increase efficiency.
But lest we get overly excited about thebeauty of incentives, it is
important to recognize that private parties'reactions to the incentives
they face can also gum up the works. Inparticular, any opportunity
that we create for outsiders to provide the PTOwith information that
is adverse to their competitors' patent applicationswill be exploited
opportunistically. That is, even in thecase of "good" applications, if
I can easily throw some kind of speed bumpin my competitor's path,
I will probably be happy to doso. This means that any change in
procedures that makes it easier for competitorsto intervene will, to
some extent, increase the cost, uncertainty and delay for validpatent
applications.
Ultimately, attention to incentivescan mitigate, but not eliminate,
the tradeoffs that must be madeamong the cost of the system, its reli-
ability in terms of screening out bad applications,and the speed and
certainty with which good applicationsare processed into issued pat-
ents. We could have a system that madevery few mistakes, and issued
valid patents quickly, but it would bea very expensive system to run,
because it would requirea lot of time by very experienced examiners.
We could have a system that putso many hurdles in the path of an
application that bad patents almostnever issued, but without a lot of
resources such a system would inevitably slow downor deny many
valid applications. Or we can have the existingsystem, in which we
make it so easy to get a patent thata lot of stuff gets through that
shouldn't.33 Jaffe and Lerner
What we can't do is to weed out thetrash without killing anygood
stuff, and accomplish this greatlyimproved sorting without expend-
ing more resources. But perfectionneed not be the enemy of the good.
If we pay attention to the incentivesthat different reforms create for
desirable and undesirable behavior, we canrecalibrate the system to
get a better balance betweenrapid approval of good applications and
reliable rejection of bad ones, and do itwithout dramatically increased
resources.
V.Building Blocks of Reform
There are three key conceptual piecesfor thinking about patent policy
reform:
Investigate ways to create incentivesand opportunities for parties
that have information about the noveltyand obviousness of inventions
to bring that information tothe PTO when it is considering a patent
grant.
Consider the possibility for multiple levelsof review of patent appli-
cations, with the time and effortexpended escalating as an application
proceeds to higher levels, so that money is notwasted on unimportant
patents, but sufficient care is taken toavoid mistakes where the stakes
are high.
Address the role of ruling on claims of patentinvalidity based on the
existence of prior art, so that partiesthreatened by invalid patents have
a reasonable opportunityto make their case.
The first two of these concepts areaimed at making the PTO
more effective atreasonable cost. The third addresses thereality that
the best of all possible PTOs will stillmake mistakes, and so we need
a court system that iscapable of rectifying those mistakes. The next
section considers the possible implementationof the changes at the
PTO.
VI. The Quest for Quality at thePTO
At a conceptual level, ensuring thequality of the PTO examination pro-
cess has two key buildingblocks. First, Congress and the Courts must
provide the PTO with an appropriate definitionof the standard for issu-
ing a patent, particularly a definitionof nonobviousness that separatesInnovation and Its Discontents 39
the wheat from the chaff. Second, thePTO must have the appropriate
procedures to implement that standard.
A possible revamping of PTO proceduresrests on the concept that
the most efficient balancing of the needto bring in outside information
against the reality that most patentsare unimportant is brought about
by a process with multiple potential levelsof review. Examination could
begin as it does now, with the review ofan application by an examiner,
and no participation by other parties. If, however,the examiner makes
a determination that a patent should be allowed to issue,there could
then be an opportunity for "pre-grant opposition."A public notice of the
intention to issue a patent would be followed bya brief peiiod of time in
which other parties could submit to theexaminer evidence, if it exists,
of "prior art" that they believe should bethe basis for a finding that the
invention is not novel or is obvious and henceshould not issue. This
pre-grant opposition would not give outside partiesany opportunity
to argue their case, and they would not haveaccess to legal discovery
processes to produce additional evidence of prior art. It wouldsimply
be an opportunity for parties that haveinformation in their possession
to put this information before the examiner.
If this option had been in place whencertain problematic patents
were being pursuedsuch as the award to MBA Vergil Daughteryfor
the "expirationless option"it would have beena simple matter for an
investment bank, or an annoyed academic,to send the patent examiner
the 1960s-vintage paperson the subject by Paul Samuelson and Robert
Merton. While the articles themselvesare somewhat technical, one only
needs to read their abstracts to realize thatan infinite-lived option is not
a new idea. With these papers in his possession, theexaminer would
have known that the Daughtery applicationwas not novel, and pre-
sumably would have rejected it.
If, after reviewing any evidence that arises inthis manner, the exam-
iner decides to issue the patent, there couldthen be a final opportu-
nity for review in the form ofa request for re-examination. This request
would have to include a stated basis fora case that the patent is invalid,
and the P10 could decline to grant there-examination request if no
such basis exists. But if re-examination doescommence, it would be a
complete review of the initial decision, undertakenby an independent
examiner, and with opportunity for theparty requesting re-examina-
tion to argue their case.3
The logic of re-examination----as distinct frompre-grant opposition
can be seen in the case of the Amazon "one click"patent. Unlike the40 Jaffe and Lemer
infinite-lived option, there is no pre-existingpublished scientific paper
that unambiguously demonstratesthe existence of prior art render-
ing the one-click patentnon-novel or obvious. Rather, the case for its
obviousness lies in the broad patternof software practices in use over
time. Making the case thatthis pattern rendered the Amazon applica-
tion obvious would probably requireargument and explanation, per-
haps including testimony by expertwitnesses. By design, the pre-grant
opposition procedure does not permitthis, because it must be kept
quick and simple so as not to delaythe bulk of valid patent grants. But
a tremendous amount wasclearly at stake in this dispute. If aviable
re-examination option had existed,barnesandnoble.com and other
parties would have had the incentiveand opportunity to demonstrate
the invalidity of the Amazon patent,resolving the dispute without the
need to involve the courts.
The logic of this escalating seriesof examinations is that most pat-
ents would never receiveanything other than the most basicexamina-
tions. But for those applicationsthat really matter, parties would have
an incentive andopportunities to bring information in theirpossession
before the PTO, and the PTO would havethe opportunity to make sure
it makes the right decision in the casesthat really matter. Let's now
consider each of these steps in somedetail.
Pre-grant Opposition
The logic of allowing limited oppositionprior to grant is that the PTO
cannot know everything there is toknow, and the applicant does not
have appropriate incentives to bring ininformation that undermines
validity. Other parties are likely to haveinformation that bears on valid-
ity, and they have an incentive toprovide it. They have not histori-
cally been given any opportunity toprovide it, partially because patent
applications have been secret up until thetime that a patent is granted.
But now that most applications arepublished 18 months after applica-
tion, there is really no reason not toallow parties that have informa-
tion that they believe bears on thevalidity of a patent application to
bring that information to theexaminer's attention. At this stage, only
the examiner would decidewhether the information is relevant, and
what consequences, if any, it has for theapplication. Therefore, there
need not be any significant delay orincreased expense.
Under current procedures, outside partiesdo have certain opportu-
nities to insert information aboutprior art into the PTO process, butInnovation and Its Discontents 41
these opportunities are structured insuch a way as to minimize both
the incentive to use them, and thepossibility that they will actually
affect the outcome. For example, inthe case of continuatibn and divi-
sional applications, it is possibleto learn from the PTO website that
such an application has been filed,even before the application is legally
"published." Under PTO rules,one can ifie a "protest" of such a pend-
ing application, arguing that theapplication should not be granted,on
any grounds related to patentability, includingobviousness. But the
catchwhich has no apparentpurpose other than making it hard to get
outside information into theprocessis that such a protest has to be
filed before the application is legallypublished.4 Since legal publication
occurs eighteen months after filing, this puts thewould-be protester
in the odd position of watching fornew applications to pop up in the
list of divisional/continuationapplications, and getting in theprotest
before the application is technically"published." Go figure.
The other existing mechanism foradding information to the PTO
record (short of requesting re-examination,discussed further below) is
to simply dump citations of pre-existingpatents or other publications
into the patent ifie after the patent hasissued.5 Of course, this is too late
for the information to have the desiredbeneficial effect of getting the
examiner to make the right decision beforeit is too late.
The most efficacious time periodto allow outsiders to provide infor-
mation about prior art is, ofcourse, after publicationwhen the world
is officially on notice that the PTO isconsidering granting a patentbut
before the patent is granted,so that the information can be considered
by the examiner before making thatdecision. As we have emphasized,
creating such an opportunity neednot unduly gum up the process,
because outside parties wouldnot be afforded the opportunity toargue
their case or otherwise participate in theproceedingonly to provide
information.
Given this limited participation, it isimportant to consider how the
legal treatment of informationso provided affects the incentive topro-
vide it. In particular, if thepatent issues despite the purported priorart
submitted by an outside party,a legal presumption regarding the valid-
ity of the patent over the art thatwas provided by the outside party
would seriously undermine the incentiveto provide information in
this way: someone considering givingthe examiner information would
have to worry about "wasting"good stuff on an examiner who might
not understand it, thereby destroyingor seriously weakening its value
in some future forum.Jaffe and Lerner
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To make this concrete, supposethis procedure had been in place
while the Daugherty patent wasbeing examined, and someonehad
sent in the amuelson articles,but for whatever reason theexaminer
still issued the patent. If there is everlitigation over this patent, parties
would want to challenge the validityof the patent on the grounds that
Daughtery's invention was not novel,given the previously published
paper. If these papershad indeed been put in front ofthe examiner,
standard legal practice would be to presumethat they did not invalidate
the patent, since the examiner sawthem and issued the patent anyway.
This presumption would make it moredifficult to invalidate the pat-
ent on these grounds. Ifthe party supplying these papershad had an
appropriate opportunity to explaintheir significance to the examiner,
it would be reasonable to presumethat an examiner that nonetheless
ignored them had good basis for doing so,and to put a heavy burden
on anyone who laterwants to argue their relevance.But the proposed
procedure does not give the providerof such information any oppor-
tunity to explain its significance, sothere is no reason to create a pre-
sumption that the information hasbeen appropriately considered. Hence
it is perhaps appropriate, andimportant in terms of maintaininggood
incentives, to allow people tosubmit such information, but also to use
it later, if necessary, without anyadverse presumption.
Post-grant Re-examination
The logic of making any oppositionthat occurs prior to the patent grant
be of the limited formdescribed above is so that it cannotbe used stra-
tegically by competitors to delay orobstruct the granting of a valid
patent. But because of thislimited nature, pre-grant oppositionis not
likely to be sufficient to ensure thatinvalid patents are not issued. For
this reason, it is worth considering anadditional step in the escalating
intensity of examination, inwhich there is an opportunity forformal
re-examination of issued patents.Compared to pre-grant opposition,
re-examination should afford partieschallenging a patent more oppor-
tunityto make their case. But becauseof the possibility of opportunis-
tic opposition to valid patents,it is worth considering puttingbarriers
in place that limit firms'ability to use re-examinationstrategically or
frivolously.
The use of re-examination toeliminate bad patents exploits two
of the important Simple Truths.First, it focuses additional examina-
tion resources not on all patents,but on the relatively small fractionofInnovation and Its Discontents
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patents that are important enoughto care about. It thereby offers hope
to improve examination standardsin a cost-effective maimer. Second,it
creates an opportunity for outsideparties that hold relevant information
about patentability to bring thatinformation to the PTO's attention.By
creating an incentive for outsidersto bring the relevant informationto
the examiner's attention, theexaminer can make a better decisionwhile
using fewer publicresources than would be necessary if theexaminer
had to go out and find all relevantinformation himself or herself.
A final benefit of workablepre-grant opposition and re-examination
procedures is that they would assistthe PTO in getting itself educated
about new and rapidly evolvingtechnologies. Giving outsiders the
opportunity and incentive to bringimportant, relevant information
into the process will not onlyimprove decisions in the individualcases
where it occurs, it will providegeneral education for examiners about
how new, dynamic fieldsare evolving, and where the prior art tendsto
be found. This should result inbetter decisions across the board.
Some strengthening of theexamination received by all patents could
complement the institution of effectivere-examination and pre-grant
opposition. The Rational Ignoranceprinciple means that it is not effi-
cient to give all patents the kindof scrutiny that they get in litigation
or even in a re-examination. But thecurrent standard is so low that it is
almost surely inefficient. If the P10set as a goal to approximately dou-
ble the average examiner timeper granted patentincluding whatever
time is needed to review evidencesubmitted under pre-grantopposi-
tionand combined this increasedcare with effective re-examination,
it ought to be able to crediblycommit to a significant reductionin the
issuance of obvious and non-novelpatents. This could be expected to
set up the "virtuous cycle" by discouragingapplications that are made
today only because applicantsknow that they can getaway with it.
Unfortunately, there isno way to know how large a reduction in
applications would be brought aboutby a credible tightening ofexami-
nation standards. But there isreason to believe it would be significant.
Since 1990, when the PTOwas converted to its current user-friendly
structure, applications have increasedfrom about 150,000per year
to about 350,000 peryear. There are multiple factors at workin this
increase, including the enhancedvalue of patent protection sincethe
creation of the CAFC and theexpansion of patentability tocover unam-
biguously the areas of biotechnology,software and business methods.
There is also some evidence thatthe increased rate of applicationrepre-
sents a real, broad increase in the underlyinginnovation rate (Kortum44
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and Lerner 1998 and 2003).But it is unlikely that thesefactors explain
a greater than100 percent increase over adozen years. It is likely that
a transformationof the examination processsuch that applicants know
that frivolous applicationswifi be denied would reducethe application
rate to the range of250,000 per year, roughly a thirdless than the cur-
rent rate, and the rate thatprevailed as recently as 1998. This meansthat
a doubling ofexaminer effort per applicationcould be brought about
with only about a one-thirdincrease in examiner resources.(Devoting
twice as much effort to250,000 applications would beequivalent to
maintaining the current effortlevel if there were 500,000applications,
which is about a third more thanthere are now.)
Whatever the numbers might turnout to be, the importantprinciple
is that the looseningof examination standards inthe last decade has
set up a vicious cycle that isnot good for inventors orfor the PTO. This
cycle has to be reversed. Itwill take time, because potentialapplicants
will not immediately changetheir behavior. But the PTO mustunder-
take real reform in order tobreak the vicious cycle, and try toestablish
the virtuous cycle of morecredibly discouraging frivolousapplications,
which in turn will make it easier tomuster the resources to sustaincred-
ibility.
Devilish Details
Patent opposition and re-examinationare not, in fact, newideas. Euro-
pean countries haveused patent oppositions for many years(Graham
et al. 2002; Hall et al.2004). Congress first introducedre-examination
into the U.S. patent systemin 1980. This proceduredid not, however,
allow parties other than thePTO and the applicant to participatein the
proceeding, thus missing theopportunity to take advantageof infor-
mation in the hands of thirdparties. In 1992, the AdvisoryCommission
on Patent LawReform (1992) recommendedthat the re-examination
procedure be expanded to allowfor the participation of outsideparties.
In 1999, Congress introducedsuch third-party participation aspart of
the American InventorsProtection Act ("AIPA").
Re-examination under the AIPAhas not been a success. Only300
patents were, in fact,re-examined in 2002. And of these,only 25 were
re-examined under the new AIPAprocedure that permits third par-
ties to participate in there-examination. Given that someamount of
mistakes in initial examinationis inevitable, even a PTOoperating
efficiently and appropriatelywould likely have generated morethanInnovation and Its Discontents
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300 re-examinations from theapproximately 190,000 patents currently
granted per year. Given the generalagreement that a lot of these grants
are dubious, it is inconceivable thata re-exan-th-ation procedure per-
ceived to be fair and effective would havegotten so little business.
The reasons why thenew procedure is not widely used areeasy to
understand: Congress ignoredsome key recon-imendations of the 1992
Commission when it created the rules forre-examination.
The tension in the design of thisprocess derives from the incen-
tivesgood and badthat it creates. Wewant a procedure that makes
it feasible and attractive for outsideparties to bring to bear real infor-
mation that they possess about thevalidity of a given patent. Butwe
don't want to create an opportunityfor competitors to frivolouslyor
maliciously try to shoot down validpatents. Given that validity and
frivolity are always tosome extent subjective, these two objectivesare
partially in conflict.
In passing the AIPA, Congresserred on the side of makingsure that
the re-examination could not be abusedto hold up valid patents. But
the protections that it built in for thepatentee make the procedurevery
unattractive, even to a party that hasa valid basis for challenging a
patent:
First, if the re-examination resultsin the patent grant being with-
drawn, the applicant can then appealthis decision to the courts. Buta
decision not to withdraw thegrant cannot be appealed by a challenging
party. This makes the risks inherent in theprocess asymmetric.
On top of this, if there isever subsequent litigation over the patent
because, for example, thepatentee sues the party that challengedthe
patent for patent infringementthe challengeris legally barred from
making any argument regarding thevalidity of the patent that they
could have made in there-examination, even if that argumentwas never
considered by the PTO.
Finally, the kind of evidence thatcan be brought by third parties to
try to prove invalidity has been limitedin two important ways. First,
the evidence must be in the formof patents and other printed pub-
lications. For many of themost controversial patents, particularlyin
the software and business methodsarea, the evidence regarding the
existence of "prior art" that oughtto invalidate the patentmay not be
in the form of patents or other printedpublications.'Second, until this
portion of the law was changed in 2003,challengers were barred from
presenting at the re-examination evidencethat was considered by theJaffe and Lerner
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examiner during the initialexamination process. This meansthat the
re-examination process was uselessfor the situation where an examiner
saw a piece of priorart, but failed to grasp itssignificance.6
So suppose that your competitorhas just gotten a patent that you
think is bogus, but which you areworried could be claimed to cover one
of your products. You can askfor re-examination, but if you do, your
hands will be tied as to whatevidence you can bring; if you winthe
competitor can appeal, butif you lose you can't; and if you loseand end
up in litigationlater, you will be barred frommaking any argument in
the course of that lawsuit thatthe judge decides you could havebrought
in the re-examination. Ninetimes out of ten, asking forre-examination
is not going to be an attractivebet. You are better off waitingand taking
your chances in court.
To create more balancedincentives for outside parties to comefor-
ward with information that theyhave regarding validity, there-exami-
nation process could havethe following features:7
Parties could be able to bringforward any relevant factual
evidence.
If a patent survives re-examination,parties could be barred in sub-
sequent litigation only frommaking arguments that werespecifically
made and rejected by the PTO inthe re-examination.
Re-examinations could be conductedby a specialized group of "re-
examiners." An examiner who isdrawn from the same group asthe
original examiner cannot beexpected to have an open mindabout
whether a mistake might have beenmade.
Both the patentee and thechallenger could be given theright to
appeal the PTO's decision.
These changes would shift thebalance between encouraging valid
challenges and discouragingfrivolous ones in favor of more challenges.
These changes can be preventedfrom stimulating excessive challenges
by appropriate countervailingincentives. The AIPA already requires
that the PTO find that asubstantial new question ofpatentabffity has
been presented, or it does notinitiate a proceeding. Thisprovides for
quick and inexpensive dispositionof truly frivolous challenges. Finally,
the incentives of both applicantsand potential challengers toavoid
wasteful proceedings would beimproved by the appropriate use of
fees and cost-shifting. Therecould be a nontrivial fee for initiating aInnovation and Its Discontents
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re-examination proceeding, say $50,000,paid in the first instance by
the party challenging thepatent. If the challenge is successful, andthe
patent is revoked, then the originalpatent applicant could be required
to pay this amount plus the challenger'slegal fees, to the challenger.
Conversely, if the challenge isunsuccessful, the challenger could be
required to reimburse the applicant'scosts for defending the patent (as
well as having paid the fee forinitiating the proceeding).8
For a potential challenger whotruly believes that an invalidpatent
poses an important threat to her business, thisfee, and the risk ofpay-
ing both sides' costs, willnot be a significant disincentive to bringing
the challenge. But it will providesome deterrent to someone who hopes
only to throw sand in theworksknowing that the patent will likely
still be held valid in the end.Conversely, for applicants that knowthey
have pulled the woolover the examiner's eyes, the prospect ofpay-
ing the fee plus both sides'costs may seem like a high price topay for
merely delaying the likely withdrawalof the patent. They will therefore
have an incentive to fold theirtents and go away. Further, the knowl-
edge that this expensive andunattractive prospect likely lies at the
end of the road will discouragemarginal applicants from filingpatent
applications in the first place.9
The other major aspect ofreform that has been discussed byall
observers is increased rigor ofinitial examination of patents. InJune
of 2002 the PTO released withsome fanfare a "21st Century Strategic
Plan" intended to transformitself into a "highly productive,quality-
focused organization." Itcontains a variety of proposals designedto
improve the functioning of theexamination process. It also proposed
an increase in application fees, and calledupon Congress to appropri-
ate all of the fees collected forpatent applications to the PTO, insteadof
funding the PTO at levels belowthe revenues collected,as has been the
practice in recent years.
After discussions with thepatent community, the plan has been
changed somewhat, andaspects of it have been presented to Congress.
One aspect is a PTO proposalto "outsource" the search of priorart
to private companies, leavingexaminers only with the final determi-
nations regarding patentability,to be based on the prior art identified
by private contractors. In theJune 2002 version of the Plan,the PTO
had proposed that the applicantsbe required to hire search firmsto pre-
pare a prior art review for the examiner. Thisfox-hiring-the-guardfor
the-chicken-coop approachwas roundly criticized, leading the PTOto
amend its proposal. Even with thePTO responsible for supervising the48
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outside search firm, this proposalremains controversial. Theorganiza-
tion that represents examinersopposes it, on thegrounds that exam-
iners cannot ultimatelybe responsible for the qualityof the validity
decision if they are not doingthe prior art searching (Stem,2003).
Ultimately, the decision as towhether the PTO search function
remains "in-house" or ismoved to the "outhouse" (so tospeak) is
not going to determinewhether patent quality is improved.Until the
process is changed sothat other parties that knowsomething about
the technology surrounding agiven application have theopportunity
and incentive to bring thatknowledge forward, therewill be no cost-
effective way to fix the problemof low quality patents.
Many players in the patentcommunity have endorsed thePTO pro-
posal to allow it to, in effect,retain all of the fees that itcollects and
spend those resources on theexamination process (Intellectual2003;
Kirk 2003). It is likely, however,that higher fees, coupled with atruly
significant improvement inexamination standards, wouldreduce the
number of applications. Asdiscussed above, such a reduction issocially
beneficial, because it would allowthe PTO to concentrate its resources
more effectively onthe applications it does get. Butit also means that,
if the plan is trulysuccessful, the total revenue collectedwill not be as
great as the PTO is anticipating.Indeed, revenues could easily fallbelow
the level of expenditures.When that happens, the PTO mayregret hav-
ing insisted on the importanceof the link between PTO revenuesand
PTO expenditures.
This discussion illustrates animportant point that is not visiblein the
current debate about the PTOStrategic Plan. The debate over"revenue
diversion" is fundamentally offthe point. It presumes thatthe level
of fees that the PTO collectsought to determine the amountof money
that it gets to spend. Butthat is backwards. Economicanalysis would
say that Congressshould start by figuring out howmuch money the
PTO needs to do its job right.Because of the need to trainand retain
more and betterexaminers, and to update itsinformation systems,
that amount is probablysomewhat greater than the amountthat the
PTO is being allocated. Thisneednot the fact that appropriations are
less than revenuesis theeconomically supportable reason whyPTO
appropriations should increase.Now, it is not unreasonablefor Con-
gress to take theposition that the cost of runningthe PTO ought to
ultimately be borne by patentees.This implies that the increased appro-
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by this analysis the link runs from neededappropriations toward the
setting of revenue levelsnot the otherway round.
Of course, giving the PTOmore money will not magically make it
more effective. It must also solve the management failures thatplagued
all of its earlier efforts to modernize itsoperations. More fundamentally,
it has to change the very concept of "productivity"that it pursues. While
the 21st Century Plan makes the rightnoises about "quality" rather
than just serving "customers," the factremains that the PTO defines its
management objectives in terms of reducing the time it takesto pro-
cess patents, and continues to reward examiners basedon measures of
productivity that encourage granting patents ratherthan granting only
valid patents. What youmeasure and what you reward is going to be
what your employees deliver. If the PTOis serious about patent qual-
ity, it has to overhaul its compensationstructure, so that examiners are
rewarded for denying applicationson non-novel inventions, and for
making those denials stick. Otherwise, thevicious cycle will continue,
no matter how much more money is spent.
VII.Leveling the Judicial Playing Field
Breaking the vicious cycle of bad examinationand bad patent applica-
tions is the key to reform of theprocess that produces patents. But as
we have emphasized, there are always going to be mistakes, andso
it is important that the court systemoperate as efficiently as possible
to rectify those mistakes, while also permittingowners of valid pat-
ents to enforce the legal rights the patentconveys. As discussed above,
the CAFC has significantly tilted the legal playingfield in favor of pat-
entees. In this section we discuss possibilities for adjustingthis tilt, to
preserve the rights of holders of valid patents while improving thereli-
ability with which bad patentsare weeded out.
The Presumption of Validity
The problem of actual or threatened infringementsuits based on dubi-
ous patents is greatly aggravated by the legal doctrine thata patent
granted by the patent office is entitled toa legal presumption as to its
validity. Because of this presumption of validity,anyone challenging
an issued patent must prove by "clear and convincing evidence"that
the patent is invalid. The "clear andconvincing evidence" standard is50 Jaffe and Lerner
not as high as the "beyond areasonable doubt" that must be proved in
a criminal case, but itdoes tilt the legal playing field in avalidity dis-
pute in favor of patentees. (By wayof contrast, to win its infringement
claims the patentee must prove infringementonly by a "preponder-
ance of the evidence,"meaning that the balance of the evidence is in
its favor.) Given that issues of prior artand obviousness are inherently
to some degree subjective, settingthis high standard for proof makes
it hard for anyone to be confidentthat they can invalidate a patent,
even if they think theyhave pretty good evidence of, for example,hav-
ing independently developed theirtechnology before the patented
invention.
Another aspect of the presumption ofvalidity is that the kind of evi-
dence that can be presented to proveinvalidityis limited. If I am trying
to convince a jury that a patent wasgranted that should not have been,
I might want to try to show just howfew hours the examiner worked
on the applicationbefore granting it, or the number of other patents
approved by this examiner that havesubsequently been found to be
invalid. But such evidence is typically notallowed, on the theory that
an examiner workingin her official governmental capacityhas to be
presumed to have done their job appropriately.
These legal rules go a long way to explainingwhy many firms, faced
with a claim of infringement of a patent thatthey think is invalid, none-
theless will drop an infringing product or pay aroyalty. It simply may
not make sense to fight if someof your weapons are inoperable, and
your opponent isprotected by high walls.
The presumption of validity accorded patentshas an explicit statutory
basis,1° but it is an example of a broaderprinciple of administrative law:
issues that have been appropriatelyvetted before a competent decision-
making body should be presumed to havebeen decided correctly. From
the local zoning board to the U.S.Environmental Protection Agency to
the Federal Trade Commission, thesedecisions are typically made after
some kind of openadministrative process, in which all interested par-
ties generally have a right to participate.There is an inherent logic to
affording a degree of deference to decisionsmade in this manner.
But as we have seen, the process bywhich a patent is granted is sun-
damentally different from these otheradministrative decisions. All
interested parties are most definitely notinvited to participate in the
examination process. There is thusfundamentally a much weaker logi-
cal case for the presumption of validitythat the patent statute affords
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Going beyond the conceptual framework, thecurrent practice of the
PTO is also clearly inconsistent witha presumption of validity Out-
side of legal doctrine, reasonablepeople do not hold a presumption
if everyday observation demonstrates thatthe presumption in ques-
tion is often false. Further, because of theRational Ignorance principle,
there is a sense in which validity couldnever be a logically sensible
presumption to make about all patents. So it mightseem logical to drop
the presumption of validity allow evidenceof examiner indifferenceor
incompetence to be presented if it exists, andcreate a level playing field
on which the jury simply decides whether the evidence,on balance,
favors validity or invalidity ofa challenged patent. Indeed, the FTC in
its report specifically recommends Congressionalaction to change the
standard of proof of invalidity to the balanced"preponderance of the
evidence" standard (U.S. F.T.C., 2003,p. 8).
There is, however, an importantreason to maintain the presumption
of validity Remember that the fundamentalpurpose of the patent sys-
tem is to give inventors a basis for expecting thatthey will have an
opportunity to recover investments that they makein developing and
commercializing their invention. Whena start-up firm goes out to raise
money for this purpose, it is important that the patentor patents that
are claimed as the basis for the protecting the firm's technologyhave the
presumption of validity If, instead, the validity issuewere reduced to a
legal coin flip, it would greatly increaseuncertainty. Uncertainty is the
enemy of investment, so patents of uncertain validity wouldbe much
less effective in providing a base for developmentof innovations.
For this reason, eliminating the presumptionof validity is a poten-
tially dangerous change in terms of its long-runconsequences for the
innovation process. The alternative is to changethe system so that it
is, in fact, a reasonable presumptionto hold. This is why a viablere-
examination process is so important. Because of theRational Ignorance
principle, it would never be reasonableto assume that the output of
the initial examination process could bepresumed to be valid. But if
all parties have the opportunity torequest re-examination on the basis
of factual evidence in their possession,then the presumption might
become reasonable.
If re-examination wasnever requested on a given patent, it is indeed
reasonable to presume that the patent isvalid, because the parties
most likely to hold evidence of its invalidity hadan incentive and an
opportunity to present that evidence. This isnot to say that a patent for
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it is reasonable for there to be apresumption of validity with all that
implies regarding the standard ofproof that must be met by a party
that ultimately does wish to challengesuch a patent. And if a patent
is re-examined, and survivesre-examination, the Rational Ignorance
principle does not apply. A request forreexamination__particularly if
it is a reasonably expensive request tomakecombined with a decision
by the applicant not to withdraw inthe face of such a request, tells the
PTO that this is an importantapplication. We should expect the pat-
ent office in a re-examinationproceeding to devote sufficient resources
to "get it right." Again, thisprocedure doesn't prove validity, but it is
enough to form a basis for a presumptionof validity.
Thus the existence of a viable re-examinationoption serves the inter-
ests both of parties worriedabout invalid patents and parties who
want the full economic benefitof their valid patents. It helps the former
by providing a forum in whichappropriate incentives are created for
third parties to bring forth relevantfacts, and for the PTO to devote the
appropriate resources to sifting throughthose facts. Perhaps less obvi-
ously, it helps the holders of truly validpatents, because it can be the
"dog that didn't bark." If an effectivere-examination procedure exists,
then the fact that it is not invoked in a given caseprovides a logical (as
distinct from a legal) basis for overcomingthe Rational Ignorance prin-
ciple, and truly presuming that the patentis valid.
Trial by Jury
Another complaint of attorneys whodefend infringement suits is that
the right of jury trial stacks the deck infavor of patent holders. There
seem to be several parts tothis argument. First is theuncontroversial
observation that the evidence in a patent case canbe highly technical,
and the average juror has little competenceto understand and evalu-
ate it. On the surface, the effectof juror incompetence would seem to
be neutral as between an accusedinfringer and a patentee. Even if it is
neutral, however, having decisions madeby people who can't really
understand the evidence does increasethe uncertainty surrounding
the outcome. Such uncertainty is amajor factor in accused infringers
settling rather than fighting evenwhen they think they have a pretty
good case.
More subtly, jurors' inability to grasptechnical evidence may inter-
act with the presumption ofvalidity in a way that helps patentees and
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party on balance presented better evidence wins,then perplexed jurors
would not seem to favor one sideover the other. And this is, indeed, the
standard for proving infringement, which is whatthe patentee needs to
prove to win. But when one side has to achievea reasonably high level
of proof, it seems plausible that jurors'inability to truly understand
the evidence being presented isnot neutral, but rather acts against the
party that must achieve a high standard of proof.If, at the end of the
trial, the jurors are simply befuddled by theevidence, the most likely
outcome is that they will conclude that neither sidehas made a con-
vincing case. Thus the "clear and convincingevidence" standard com-
bined with decision-making by juriesmakes it likely that the patentee
will win on validity questions. (Whichis why most patentees ask fora
jury trial!) Put another way, it isvery difficult to ever make the evidence
"clear and convincing" to agroup of people who do not have the neces-
sary training and education to understand it.
Regardless of whom it benefits, to nonlawyersit does seem hard to
argue that lay jurors are the best decision-makers inpatent suits. Of
course, the right to a jury of one's peers isa venerated concept in Anglo-
American law. But there isn't reallyany sense in which a patent jury is,
in fact, a jury of peers. A jury of scientistsand engineersthe actual
peers of the inventorprobably would be a relativelycompetent deci-
sion-making group. But, of course, that isnot what we get. If we left
patent cases to judges rather than juries,we would still not have sci-
entists. But judges spend their professional livesevaluating evidence
in many different disciplines, and haveto develop some ability to sort
through it. Further, a judge always has the abilityto appoint a "Master,"
an outside expert in the service of the court, whocan rule on specific
technical questions put to her by the judge.
The CAFC has, in fact, putsome limits on the role of juries in patent
cases. In particular, it is the job of the judge, not the jury,to interpret the
patent's claims." Typically, judges receivewritten and oral arguments,
and often the testimony of expertwitnesses, and then issue detailed
instructions to the jury regarding what theclaims mean. Thus, when it
comes to the question of infringementon which thepatentee needs
to carry the burden of proof in order to winthejudge assists the jury
by interpreting the technical languageof the claims before putting the
question of infringement to the jury. However, whenit comes to a lack
of novelty or obviousnesswhich theaccused infringer must prove
in order to invalidate the patent, andmust do so with clear and con-
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inherently no less technical than thoseof claim construction, and there
does not appear to be any logical orsubstantive argument as to why a
lay jury is the appropriatedecision-making body for these questions.It
would be entirely feasible for thejudge to "construe" the novelty and
obviousness of the patented inventionrelative to some other invention,
just as the judge "construes"the claims of the patents. The ultimate
question of patent validity could stillbe left up to the jury. If, for exam-
ple, the judge ruled that the patent at issue wasobvious or non-novel
relative to some other specifiedinvention, there might still be a dispute
as to whether thatother invention was, in fact, part of theprior art at
the time of patent ffling. The jurycould then appropriately decide that
question, based on testimonyand documentary evidence as to when
the invention in question came to beknown.
If the PTO were revamped so that apresumption of validity was
appropriate, and if the burden of provinginvalidity by "clear and con-
vincing evidence" were madefeasible by removing the technical deter-
mination of novelty and nonobviousnessfrom the jury, then patent
litigation would be the appropriatelast resort when disputes over pat-
ent claims cannot be resolved anyother way. There would still be pat-
ent suits, and they would stillbe expensive. In areas where technology
is changing rapidly, and there are numerouscompeting and overlap-
ping claims, there would still beconsiderable uncertainty about who
has the rights to what technology.But the pervasive fear that almost
any modern (or not somodern!) product or process is continuously at
risk of facing an infringementclaim would be dramatically reduced.
And when claims are made based on patentsof questionable validity,
accused miringers would negotiatefrom a position where both parties
expect a reasonably competentdetermination as to novelty and non-
obviousness. This should reduce(though not eliminate) the incentive to
pay rOyalties andsettle rather than undertake a challengethat is risky,
no matter howquestionable the validity of the assertedpatent.'2
VIII.Software, Genes, and Other AllegedPatent Nightmares
We have seen the difficulties thathave been created by bad patents in
many differenttechnologies and industries. And we havediscussed the
inherent difficulties that arise becausegranting patents restricts and
inhibits cumulative and overlappinginventions. The possible changes
described above are intended to create apatent system that better
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create a perfect system, or one that somehow eliminates theinherent
tradeoffs.
Other observers, grappling with the current dysfunctionof the pat-
ent system with regard to particular technologiesor industries, have
concluded that the problems of encouraging invention in thatparticu-
lar setting require a patent policy that distinguishesamong technolo-
gies. Software, business methods, and certainaspects of biotechnology
such as genetic sequences are all technologies for whichthe courts have
expanded the range of patentable subject matter beyond whatwas per-
ceived to be patentable at the end of the 1970s. Each ofthese areas has
subsequently been characterized by major controversiesover patents
that appear to be invalid, overly broad,or both, leading to concern that
the patent system is inhibiting rather than encouraginginvention in
these areas. As a result, there have beennumerous suggestions that
inventions in these areas should not be patentable,or, if patent protec-
tion is to remain available, that different rules andprocedures are nec-
essary to adapt the institution of patents to these technologies.
Theoretical arguments can certainly be made in favor of "tuning"the
attributes of patent protection in different technologicalareas to reflect
the attributes of different technologies, includingeliminating patent
protection entirely for technologies with certain attributes. Butopen-
ing the door to such tuning is likely to lead quicklyto special pleading
that will not serve the public interest. To understand thesearguments,
we consider in turn the three most important perceived problemareas:
business methods, software, and biotechnology.
Funny Business over Business Methods
The CAFC has eliminated the long-perceived prohibitionon patenting
business methods, and there have beensome silly manifestations of
this new art form, such as the Amazon one-clickpatent. The European
Patent Office does not permit patentson business methods, and some
have suggested that creating anew business method is not, fundamen-
tally, an act of "invention," and hence shouldnot be the basis for a pat-
ent. Following the controversy over the "one-click" patent, JeffBezos
of Amazon.com proposed that the patent life for softwareand business
method patents be reduced from the standard 20years to only 3 to 5
years.
It is clear that the PTO has done a disastrously bad jobin testing
applications for business patents against the prior art. And thisis not56 Jaffe and Lerner
really surprising. The prior art that patent examinersfind most easily
is previously issued patents. Beyond old patents,they have some abil-
ity to search for and identify prior art that appearsin other published
forms, such as scholarly publications. But in the areaof business meth-
ods, most of the prior art is not in patents;indeed, it cannot be, because
until recently people thought that businessmethods were unpatentable!
And the prior art is not usually in publications, atleast not the ones that
the PTO is used to looking at. The prior artof business methods is in the
day-in-and-day-out practice of business large andsmall. That is hard
for the PTO to find, and it has done a bad job of it.
But it is not clear that the solution to thatproblem is to abolish busi-
ness method patents. Thealternative is to change the structure of the
examination process so that opportunities andincentives are created
for the parties that do have knowledge of therelevant prior art to bring
it forward. As noted above, it is unlikelythat the one-click patent would
have survived an appropriately designedre-examination process.
The argument that new business methods arenot really inventions
is, at best, an irrelevant semantic one,and, at worst, a kind of techno-
snobbery that is inconsistent with how technologyevolves in general.
What is the substantive difference between a"tinkerer" who comes up
with some new kind of machine, and a businessvisionary who comes
up with a new method ofinventory management? In either case, the
invention may be made with or without thebenefit of "science" in
any meaningful sense. To saythat one is technological and one is not
is pointless. The real question, from a policyperspective, is whether
the incentive provided by patent protection is necessaryto bring forth
the invention, and/or to protect it sufficiently tojustify the invest-
ment necessary to work the kinks outand develop the raw idea into a
viable commercial product or process. One can come upwith indi-
vidual examples of new business methods thatrequired little develop-
ment investment, but the same is trueof inventions in other areas. As a
general proposition, important new businessmethods are not dissimilar
from other forms of innovation: they oftenrequire major investments
of time and money in development; there aremethods other than
patents (e.g., secrecy) that can sometimesbe used to protect these
investments, but there are also cases where, inthe absence of patent
protection, the risk of imitation wouldseriously undermine develop-
ment incentives.
In summary, the problem with business patentsis that many appear
to have been issued for inventionsthat were obvious; if so, they shouldInnovation and Its Discontents 57
not have been granted. If you got rid of theseinvalid patents, there is not
an evident problem of business method patents inordinatelyrestricting
ongoing business innovation. With the rightprocedures, the number of
patents on business methods would probably besmall, because there is
a lot of prior art out there against whichone would have to prove nov-
elty and nonobviousness. But thereis no fundamental economicreason
why an entrepreneur who really doescome up with a novel and non-
obvious method of doing business needspatent protection less than an
entrepreneur trying to make a go of comfortablehigh-heel shoes or a
new way of using radio spectrum for cell phones.
Software: An Open and Shut Case for "OpenSource"?
Closely related to the controversyover business method patents is tre-
mendous unhappiness over the grantingof patents on software. Like
business methods, this is anarea where much of the prior art is not in
patents, and often not in published works, butrather in practice. Again,
the PTO appears not to have donea good job at making sure that appli-
cations for software patentsare tested against this nonpublished prior
art. The result has been a deluge of patentsgranted on software con-
cepts that appear not to be new.
Making things even worse, the PTO, with theapparent guidance of the
CAFC, also seems to have reducedor eliminated the requirement that
a patent application describe the new invention withsufficient detail to
enable one skilled in the relevant artto reproduce the invention (Burt
and Lemley 2002). This drastic weakeningof the "enablement" require-
ment seems to have led to a situation wherepatents can be attained on
the idea that something could beperformed with software, without the
patent applicant having done much at allto implement the idea (Bessen
and Hunt 2003). The result has beena flood of patent applications on
myriad diverse software ideas; in principlethe recipient of such a pat-
ent then has the right to exclude others fromimplementing the covered
software idea, despite the fact that theyhave never implemented,or
even described implementing, the idea themselves.
Once again, the solution to these problemsdoes not seem to be soft-
ware-specific. To encourage invention andtechnological change, the
PTO should grant patents onlyon novel, nonobvious software devel-
opments, and should require the applicantto describe the covered soft-
ware in some detail, so that patents onlygo to people who have created
something rather than to those who merelythought about creatingJaffe and Lerner
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something. The horror stories aboutridiculous software patents would
then go away along with the PB&J,one-click, and other disasters.13
There are some who would gofurther and argue that patents are
fundamentally inapplicable to software(Bessen and Maskin 2001).
This argument has two related pieces.The first is the straightforward
observation that software innovation wasflourishing before the 1980s,
when the CAFC clarified, andbroadened the patentability of software.
This seems to show that patentsfor software are not necessary. More
fundamentally, it is argued that thesoftware development is by its
nature so cumulative that itis impossible to parse out thecontribu-
tion of one developer sufficiently togrant patent rights, and it is coun-
terproductive to try to do so becausesubsequent development will be
hampered. These ideas are embodied inwhat has come to be called the
"open source" movement, which arguesthat all software should be in
the public domain, availablefor all to use, modify and build on asthey
see fit.'4
It is surely true that there wassoftware innovation before software
patents were widely used. Aswith all other technologies, it isunlikely
that software developmentwould grind to a halt without patent pro-
tection. And it is also true thatsoftware innovation is a highly cumula-
tive process. But the reality isthat virtually all innovation is a highly
cumulative process, and the patent systemhas been struggling with
the tradeoffs that implies for a longtime'5 The relevant question is: on
balance, would a properlyadministered regime of software patents foster
innovation, by allowing parties thatmake true breakthroughs a mea-
sure of protection toreduce the risks of commercializingthat devel-
opment? As with business methods, wehaven't had a test of such a
system because the PTO hasfailed to implement the requirementsof
novelty, nonobviousness and enablement.
If the overall patent system werereformed as we have proposed, the
only software that would bepatentable would be that which truly rep-
resents a nonobvious stepforward, and the implementation ofwhich
is laid out in some detail. Grantingpatents of this sort would not stop
others who wish to work withinthe open-source paradigm from doing
so, and would notprevent open-source advocates fromarguing their
case and trying to convincecomputer users not to buypatented soft-
ware. It may be that theadvantages of open-source development are
sufficient that many or most softwaredevelopers would choose to
forego patents and work withinthe open-source paradigm instead. If
the PTO were doing its jobproperly, any software that is developedInnovation and Its Discontents
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and published freely byopen-source advocates or otherprogram-
mers could never itself be patented, becauseno one could ever claim
novelty in having created it. Soa properly functioning patentsystem is
not inconsistent witha vibrant open-source softwaremovement. The real enemy ofopen-source softwareand software innovationmore
generallyis poor implementation ofsoftware patents, not thecon-
cept. The real question is whethera programmer who has a trulynew
software invention oughtto have the option of patenting itrather than
making it open-source. Noone has put forth a convincingargument
why that choice shouldnot lie with the innovator, ratherthan being
made for the entire industryas a matter of law or policy.
Should Mere Mortals Control theHuman Genome?
The last importantarea in which the CAFC expandedpatentability
is biotechnology. And again,there has been muchconcern about the
granting of patents thatappear obvious in light of previous develop-
ments, and which grant broad rightsthat seem to cover withone patent
many diverse possible uses. As with softwareand business methods,
the solution lies in rigorousenforcement of the fundamental rulesgov-
erning obviousness and novelty.
An additional concern inbiotechnology is the patenting ofresearch
tools. It is feared that theneed to pay royaltieson multiple distinct
research tools in order to marketa given product is or will soon retard
the inventive process. Butagain, one must be careful to distinguishthe
problem of bad patents froman allegation that patents are bad. Ifpat-
ents are granted only on novel,nonobvious inventions, thenresearch-
ers will have to pay royalties to othersonly for the use of research tools
that were truly invented bythe patent owner. Arguably, ifthe PTO is
doing its job, a patentedresearch tool will be one that mightnot have
been available at all, if theresearcher who secured thepatent had not
developed it. It does notseem unreasonable, in such acase, for a royalty
to be paid.
Does One Patent "Size" ReallyFit All?
Lurking in the backgroundof the preceding paragraphsis the over-
arching question of whetherwe should have one set of patent rules
that govern all inventions,or whether the system can be mademore
efficient by tailoring patent rulesto the .specific attributes of different60
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technologies. In the world oftheoretical patent analysis, it is easyto
show that the attributesof patent protection should varydepending
on the characteristicsof the technology. Thus there appearsto be a fun-
damental theoretical case fordifferential patents, and perhaps evenfor
permitting patenting of sometechnologies but not others.The problem
with using this theory as a basisfor policy, however, is thatthe technol-
ogy characteristicsthat could provide the basisfor differential patent
treatment are typicallyabstract and difficult toquantify empirically.
It is easy, for example, totalk about cumulativeinnovation as a theo-
retical phenomenon but it is verydifficult to say concretelywhether
invention is more or lesscumulative in one sector versusanother. So
while there is a theoretical casefor a system that is notuniform, there
is no theoretical orempirical basis for sayingspecifically how patent
treatment should differ acrossspecific technologies.
There is also a strongpractical argument againstdifferential treat-
ment. Simply put,differential treatment is hard toimplement, because
as soon as patenteesin a particular category gettreatment that is differ-
ent from everyone else,there will be an inevitabletendency for people
to position themselves toget the most favorabletreatment. An example
can be seen in thePTO's efforts to deal with theoutrage over business
method patents by instituting aspecial internal review of allbusiness
method patents, on the groundsthat the prior art is difficult toiden-
tify.16 In effect, patents thatfall in a particular patent class areexamined
twice, to try to make surethat nontraditional prior art isnot missed. The
result has been a decline inapplications in the targeted class,but a con-
tinued rise in applicationsrelated to business methods morebroadly
defined. This suggests strongly thatapplicants have been going outof
their way to classify their patentsoutside of the class targeted for spe-
cial (more rigorous) treatment.As a result, the PTO'sefforts, however
well intended, are not likely tosolve the broader problemof invalid
business method patents beinggranted.
By and large, the presumptiontoday is that everyone getsthe same
patent treatment.'7 Withoutthis presumption, therewould be tremen-
dous pressure by particularindustries to get features in"their" patents
that they found desirable.Of course, the argumentsfor these prefer-
ences would alwaysbe couched in public interestterms, but when an
industry lobbyist starts talkingabout the public interest, weall know it
is a good time to keep an eye onthe consumer's wallet.
Even in the current system,where the general presumptionis for
uniformity, there are always pressuresfor special treatment. TheseInnovation and Its Discontents
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pressures have been particularly acute in thepharmaceutical industry,
where Congress opened the doorfor such gaming when it passedthe
Hatch-Waxman Act, which allowedthe PTO to extend the lengthof
patent coverage for drugs that had languishedfor an extended time in
regulatory review process.18 Inrecent years, bills have been introduced
in Congress to provide extendedpatent life for specific drugs, suchas
the allergy drug Claritin (Babcock1999). In the fall of 2002,a provision
protecting a vaccine made by pharmaceuticalmakerand large donor
to Republican campaignsEli Lillywas inserted at the last minute
into President Bush's domesticsecurity legislation. While Senate
Majority leader Bill Frist of Tennesseehad pushed such a provisionear-
lier, he has denied inserting itin the domestic security bill. Theprovi-
sion became law despite the fact thatno one, either on Capital Hill or
in the White House, is willingto admit putting it in the final versionof
the bill (Stolberg 2002). This kindof shenanigan would likely bemuch
worse in a world in which it was broadlyaccepted that differential pat-
ents for different technologieswere appropriate.
So there is grave danger in tryingto "fix" the problems perceivedto
be associated with patents inparticular areas by fooling withspecific
differential patent treatment forthese technologies. And this dangeris
simply not justified by evidence thatthe problems in business methods,
software and biotechnology derivefrom the unique properties of these
technologies. Rather, the relativeinexperience of the PTO with these
technologies, combined with theircritical importance for theeconomy,
has made the broader,more fundamental problems with thesystem
most evident. It is vitally importantto fix the problems with patenting
in these areasbut theway to do that is to fix the problems withthe
patent system more generally.
IX. A Less Kind, Less GentlePatent System
Economic analysis does notsupport abolishing patents, andeven
weakening the fundamentalpresumption of validity for appropriately
issued patents wouldcarry serious policy risks. The alternativeis to
make sure that, before theycan be used to restrict the commercial activ-
ities of competitors, patents havegotten the appropriate scrutiny to
ensure their validity. At the same time,we need to accept that the PTO
will still make mistakes, andcreate a judicial system that deals
with those mistakes ina balanced way. Doing this withoutan infea-
sible increase inresources for the Patent Office wifi require thatthejaffe and Lerner
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system be significantlymodified. The modifications shouldbe carefully
tuned to create incentives so thatprivate parties have the incentiveand
opportunity to bring information tobear, but have limited incentive
and opportunity to act simply to gum upthe works.
Possible changes that have beenproposed by various groups study-
ing the patent system are:
Greater resources devotedby the Patent Office to the processof
examination, and the efficient useof these resources to bring the day-
to-day operations of the PTO intothe 21st century;
The institution of pre-grantopposition, whereby outside parties
could provide information onprior art to the examinersbefore a patent
issues;
The institution of effectivere-examinations of granted patents,with
a true opportunityto prove invalidity before anopen-mined re-exam-
iner, combined with appropriateincentives to discouragefrivolous
requests for re-examination;and
Enhanced scope for judges orspecially appointed masters todecide
technical issues of novelty andobviousness.
The idea of these reforms is toharness the incentives of privateparties
to bring information tothe table in an efficient way.And they respect
the Rational Ignoranceprinciple, by bringing to bear a sequenceof
more rigorous (andhence more expensive) investigation, asthe stakes
get higher. Most patentswill continue to get a relatively cursoryreview
and then be forgotten. Moreimportant ones will get a morerigorous
review, and one can presumethe fewer mistakes will be made inimpor-
tant cases as a result. Forthe few cases that really matterand the PTO
still got it wrong, the courtswill provide a more balancedand reliable
final determination as to patentvalidity. As a result, the uncertainty
and patent blackmail thatincreasingly threaten the wholeinnovation
system should be reduced.
Endnotes
We thank Scott Stern for helpful comments.This essay draws heavily on Jaffe and Lerner
(2004). All errors are our own.
These general issues are alsodiscussed in previous papers in the IPE series,including
Gallini and Scotchmer (Volume 2,2002)and Hall et al. (Volume 4,2004).
See STEP Report, pp. 87-94.Innovation and Its Discontents
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Both the FTC and the STEP Report advocatethe initiation of some kind ofpost-grant
re-examination process, though not necessarilywith the specific features discussed here.
For empirical analysis of the operationof post-grant review in Europesee Hall et al. (2004).
35 USC l22(c); 37 CFR § 1.291.
35 U.S.C. § 301.
The prohibition on evidence previouslyconsidered by the examiner derived froma CAFC decision under the pre-AIPA procedurein which re-examination could be initi- ated by the PTO but excluded thirdparties (In re Portola Packaging, 110 F 3d 786(Fed. Cir. 1997)). Congress could haveoverruled this decision in the AIPA, but chosenot to. A law passed by Congress and signed byPresident Bush in 2003 finally overturnedthis decision.
Table 4-1 in the STEP Report providesa useful summary of important features ofa re-examination procedure.
The STEP report advocates a fee forrequesting re-examination, but does notcontem- plate fee-shifting based on the outcome(STEP Report, pp. 97-103).
We should also note thatas part of the AIPA, the U.S. Congress stipulateda two-month
window in which others can submit priorart after patent applications are published.No one seems to do so, because (a) not all applicationsare published, (b) many parties are
still unaware of this provision, and (c)people don't want to limit their abilityto use prior art in subsequent litigation.
35 U.S.C. § 282.
Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc.,52 F. 3d 967 (Fed Cir 1995).
The STEP report recommends severalspecific changes to modify orremove certain
"subjective" elements of patent litigation,which the STEP Committee concludedincrease the cost and uncertainty of patent litigation.See STEP Report,pp. 117-123.
Burt and Lemley (2002) argue that thevery logic that allows the CAFC to judgea sketchy description of what software mightdo as satisfying the enablementrequirement wifi, inevitably, lead the court to judgemany of the software patents currently being
granted by the PTO to be invalidon the grounds of obviousness, Of course, it wouldbe far preferable not to grant all those validpatents to begin with.
See, e.g., or http://www. freepatents.org/.
For a discussion of historical disputesover patenting in the auto, aircraft, semicon-
ductor and computer industries that bearmuch resemblance to the current softwareand business methods controversies,see Merges and Nelson (1990).
http://www.uspto.gov/web/office5/com/sol/acti0nplan
Burt and Lemley (2002)argue that this uniformity is something of an illusion, because
the CAFC interprets the uniform rulesdifferently in different industries.
The rationale for the act (more formallyknown as the Drug Price Competition and
Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984)was to ensure that each new drug hada minimum
period during which it was on the marketand protected by patent coverage. WhiletheJaffe and Lemer
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act called for these extensions tobe reviewed and granted in a formal processby the PTO,
the introduction of special legislationgeared towards particular drugs soonfollowed.
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